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ARTICLES
INTENT: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT'S POST-NAPSTER ANALYSIS OF
CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Karen M. Kramert
In July 2001, the Ninth Circuit famously slapped Napster,' the
company that facilitated free sharing of songs electronically over the
Internet, with liability for massive infringement by end-users.2 As a
result, Napster's free service for downloading songs came to an end.3
The debate about free file sharing and the extent of liability by
technology providers, however, did not.
Since Napster, new technology providers have emerged, offering
different technologies to enable the free trading of copyrighted,
unlicensed songs and movies on the Internet. The movie and music
industries decry this trading as "piracy" of their copyrighted works,
claiming a loss between $700 million to several billion dollars
annually.4
The Napster decision imposed liability for copyright
infringement based on principles of third-party liability. The Ninth
Circuit's ruling last year in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v.
t J. D. Stanford Law School 1995. Ms. Kramer previously worked as in-house counsel
at The Washington Post and as an attorney at Baker & Hostetler, where she co-chaired the
intellectual property litigation group. Thanks to Clarissa Long, Annoel Occhialino, Christine
Farley, and Jodi Danis for their comments and suggestions.
1. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. See Joseph Menn, Defunct Napster's Saga Back in Court, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004,
at Cl.
3. After the ruling, the original Napster folded and then sold its name at a bankruptcy
auction to a subscription based, online music provider. See Amy Harmon, Deal May Raise
Napsterfrom Online Ashes, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at C1; Jon Healey, Roxio Sells Software
Unit, Bets on Napster, L.A. TtMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at C2.
4. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 29, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
(No. 04-480) [hereinafter Pet. for Writ of Cert.].
5. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
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Grokster, Ltd.6 marked the most recent decision about whether to hold
network operators and software distributors liable for the trading of
songs and movies on the Internet by millions of users.'
Like Napster once did, the defendants in Grokster seek to
facilitate users' exchange of copyrighted material freely over the
Intemet.8 The Grokster defendants market themselves as the "next
Napster" or "Alternative to Napster Network."79 Ninety percent of the
material traded on their networks allegedly constitutes infringing,
copyrighted material. 10  If indeed true, the Grokster defendants
effectively achieve precisely what Napster was enjoined from doing.
Nevertheless, on a motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit
reached a very different result in assessing liability in Grokster than it
did in Napster, based primarily on.structural differences in the
technologies at issue."
The Grokster decision brings to the forefront the issue of intent,
as an evidentiary and conceptual matter, in deciding liability for
contributory copyright infringement. In essence, the Grokster
decision deems intent-related evidence irrelevant as a matter of law,
in assessing third-party liability for copyright infringement. This
occurs because the analysis lends no significance to a host of record
evidence proffered by the copyright holders in their summary
judgment motion to demonstrate that the defendants actively and
knowingly encourage infringing activity on their systems.
The issues of liability presented by the Grokster litigation, now
pending before the United States Supreme Court, 12 will affect many
Internet participants, not simply the parties in the lawsuit. The
defendants in Grokster are but a few of the many players vying to
6. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
7. Surveys show an estimated 60 million Americans have downloaded music to
computers. See Benny Evangelista, Advice to Avoid Copyright Litigation, S.F. CHRON., July 28,
2003, at El, available at
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/07/28/BU296516.DTL.
8. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158.
9. Id. at 1164; see also MGM Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55894
& 03-56236) [hereinafter MGM Pl.-App. Br.].
10. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158; MGM P.-App. Br., supra note 9, at 8 (citing record
evidence in the summary judgment motion).
11. See infra notes 70-71, 86-87 and accompanying text.
12. Following the decision in Grokster, the music and movie industries petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari on October 8, 2004. The Court granted certiorari on
December 10, 2004. A decision is expected to be issued in July 2005. Charles Lane, High
Court to Weigh File Sharing, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2004, at El.
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profit from a system that allows for the free trade of song and movie
files to Internet users.13 Moreover, the implications of a ruling in this
case extend beyond the movie and music industries, because they can
affect a host of e-commerce and other technology-related matters
concerning content over the Internet.
In order to rule in Grokster, the United States Supreme Court
likely will have to grapple with permutations of intent left unresolved
by the ambiguities of its twenty-one year old decision in Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal Studios, Inc..14  The Sony decision limits
liability in circumstances where a product may be used partly for
infringing and partly for noninfringing purposes. This article seeks to
provide a context for understanding the controversy concerning third-
party copyright liability that has emerged in the wake of the Sony
decision and unfolded over the Internet.
More specifically, Part I of this article explains the business
landscape of songs and movies delivered over the Internet. In Part II,
this article discusses the legal framework of the Grokster decision. It
explains the differences between the Ninth Circuit's analysis in
Grokster and Napster, along with a contrasting approach set forth by
the Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation.5
Furthermore, this section explains the ambiguities of the Sony
decision seeding the disparate approaches in the circuits. Part III of
this article argues that the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of intent-related
evidence strikes a lopsided balance between the rights of copyright
holders, on the one hand, and the public's right to free exchange of
information on the other. It concludes that the Ninth Circuit's
approach inappropriately elevates form over substance and creates an
inequitable playing field for emerging, license-based businesses.
I. THE MARKET FOR SONGS AND MOVIES DOWNLOADED FROM THE
WEB
Most web users also know the technology at issue in Grokster as
KaZaa, FastTrack, and Morpheus. 16  These systems offer free file
sharing of songs and movies to Internet users. The sharing of such
13. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
14. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
15. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
16. There are multiple defendants in the Grokster case. Two of the defendants initially
used a system known as "FastTrack" technology, developed by a Dutch company, KaZaa BV.
After a licensing dispute with KaZaa, one of the defendants developed "Morpheus," a version of
open-source Gnutella Code. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1159.
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material among users is commonly referred to as "peer-to-peer" or
P2P file sharing.' 7 In P2P file sharing, the end-users provide copies of
content to each other while at the same time providing their own
storage space. 18  To enable the free trade of files, the Grokster
defendants generate revenue through advertising. The greater the
number of users, the greater the amount of advertising revenue the
defendants can reap.19
The Grokster defendants are among the biggest-but not the
only-entities vying to build businesses based on free file sharing of
copyrighted works. Other P2P networks, such as edonkey, Limewire,
iMesh, BearShare DirectConnect, and BitTorrent, likewise have
sought to profit by offering free songs and movies.20  Each entity
offers its own technology system for allowing users to exchange
copyrighted material.
The technology innovations underlying peer-to-peer file sharing
have played an important role in the Ninth Circuit's analysis of
liability. As will be explained in more detail below, the Ninth
Circuit's most recent decision sets forth a very technology-specific
standard of liability: it essentially limits liability to software
distributors who operate a centralized server, and it absolves from
liability software distributors who operate more decentralized
systems.21 To appreciate the implications of the Ninth Circuit's
ruling, one must first understand the degree of rapidly developing
technology and the different motivations software distributors may
have in designing their system in a particular way.
The shift from a centralized to more decentralized system marks
one of the biggest changes to occur in peer-to-peer file sharing.
Napster employed a central server, which contained an index of all
copyrighted songs traded on the network.22  Conversely, the
17. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); see Jesse
M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete? Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc. in the Age of
Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 862-68 (2004) (providing a more detailed explanation of
the structure and operation of peer to peer networks).
18. See Feder, supra note 17, at 867.
19. See Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 4, at 12 (explaning the business model).
20. See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Firm Sleuths Out Illegal File Sharers, S.F. CHRON.,
July 21, 2003, at El, available at
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/07/21/BU289815.DTL; File-
share Facilitators Create Operating Rules, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 30, 2003, at 3; Peter
Griffin, Pirates Maraud on Local Hubs, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Oct. 24, 2003; Seth Schiesel,
File Sharing's New Face, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at G 1.
21. See infra notes 70-71, 86-87 and accompanying text.
22. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-13 (providing a detailed description of Napster's
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technologies used by the Grokster defendants differ structurally in
that they do not rely on a central server. For instance, one of the
Grokster defendants operates on a semi-centralized network.23 Under
this model, the system designates certain computers, or "supernodes,"
on the network to serve as indexing servers.2 4 Another Grokster
defendant employs an even more decentralized form of technology
that enables each user to maintain her own index of files available for
sharing.25
The shift toward decentralized systems offers different strengths
and weaknesses. For example, the strength of the central index server
is that it allows each user to search the entire network because the
entries lie in a single index in a single location.26 Speed and
efficiency, however, are limited by the central server's capacity to
handle all the demands on it.27 In addition, a failure of the central
server can immediately incapacitate the entire system. 28 Conversely,
a semi-centralized or decentralized system typically offers faster
service to the end-user.
In all systems, the software distributor can choose features that
affect its awareness of specific infringing activity and its ability to
control the content exchanged. Perhaps most significantly, software
distributors can choose whether to maintain login and registration
information of users, as well as varying degrees of control over the
types of files exchanged by users.29  By maintaining login and
registration information, a software distributor can keep track of the
identity of particular users and block access by certain users.30 To the
extent a software distributor controls which files may be offered or
exchanged, the software distributor is capable of policing infringing
activity. Login and registration information and control over the files
to be exchanged bear on issues such as a defendant's "knowledge"
and defendant's contribution to infringing activity on the network.
Knowledge, control, and contribution comprise essential elements of
architecture).
23. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir.
2004).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 1158-59.
26. See Feder, supra note 17, at 865.
27. See Feder, supra note 17, at 866.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
30. See MGM Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Brief at 21-23, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55894 & 03-56236)
[hereinafter MGM P1.-App. Reply Br.].
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the standards of third-party liability for infringement. 31 As discussed
in more detail below, the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have
adopted very different views about how a software distributor's
architectural choices affect third-party liability for infringement by
end-users.
Technology underlying P2P file sharing systems continues to
evolve in multiple directions. The degree of centralization of the
server and indexing functions marks just one area of change. For
example, BitTorrent, another P2P network, broke new ground by
changing the structure of the files themselves. Whereas earlier P2P
systems made each song a separate digital file, BitTorrent developed
a system that breaks each digital file for each song into many small
pieces.3 2 As soon as the user acquires one piece of the file, that
person's computer immediately starts uploading that piece to other
computers.3 3 Under this system, the faster a user uploads material to
other computers, the faster the user can download material3 4  The
practical result of this structure is that it becomes very easy to
distribute large files to a large number of people while placing
minimal demands on the original source of a file. 5
It is hard to predict what technological innovations in P2P
systems will take place after the Supreme Court rules in Grokster.
However, the rapidly emerging variations in how P2P systems index,
store, and permit downloading of content to date may be a harbinger
of many further changes in the future.
Not all file sharing businesses raise the ire and concern of the
copyright owners. A number of fledgling businesses involve license
or fee-based distribution of songs and movies in a high-tech manner.
These businesses are trying to compete head-on with free file
swapping services.
On the music front, Apple's iTunes stands out as the most well-
known, fee-based product. It offers songs for 99 cents that can be
played on portable music players called iPods.36  Similarly,
RealNetworks' Rhapsody enables consumers to pay $9.95 a month to
31. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
32. Schiesel, supra note 20.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Micheal Booth, Last Word in Style: iPod Musical Muse Apple of Everybody's
Eyes, DENVER POST, Nov. 23, 2003, at L11; James Coats, Movie Industry Needs to Move Past
Pirates, Cut to Good Files, C. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2004, at C2; Jefferson Graham, Music Lovers
Agree: I Want My MP3, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 2004, at 3E.
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stream or download as much music as they want from a catalog of
more than 55,000 albums.37 Microsoft's MSN Music site offers
single download songs for 99 cents and links to other fee-based
services.38 Musicmatch sells songs for download for 99 cents each or
a monthly service charge of $8 for access to its 700,000 song
collection.39 Virgin Digital, owned by a British company, offers web
users songs for 99 cents apiece from more than a million tracks.4°
In the movie arena, RealNetworks offers unlimited downloads
for $12.95 a month.' Three other businesses, Movielink,
CinemaNow, and Movieflix, offer online movie rental for $2 to $5
42
apiece.
These businesses demonstrate that consumers are willing to pay
for content. Nevertheless, Internet users may still be discouraged
from using fee-based systems in favor of the unlicensed file sharing
networks because of the more limited selection of the materials
available for a fee.
II. THE POST-NAPSTER LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. The Sony Betamax Decision
An important part of the debate about liability for file sharing on
the Internet arose well before the Napster decision. Twenty years
ago, in the context of home video tape recorders, the Supreme Court
grappled with the issue of liability for technology that is capable of
being used for both infringing and noninfringing purposes. The
Supreme Court determined that the sale of video tape recorders did
not constitute contributory infringement. The primary use of the
video tape recorders involved the practice of time-shifting, or
watching a show at a later time, which the Court determined to be
noninfringing under the doctrine of fair use.43 In light of this
noninfringing use, the manufacturer of Betamax was not liable for
contributory infringement for customers' infringing uses of that
37. Ashlee Vance, For a Fee, A Stream of Tunes, Talk and Video, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2004, at G8.
38. Id.
39. Virgin Adds U.S. Online Music Store, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at C6.
40. Id.
41. Vance, supra note 37.
42. Id.
43. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,421,443 (1984).
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technology.44 The Court referred to this protection as the "staple
article of commerce doctrine," which it borrowed from patent law.45
Setting the stage for later confusion, the Supreme Court
inconsistently expressed when the protection should apply. In one
passage, the Court suggested that the technology owner need only
show the capacity of its equipment to be used for a noninfringing
purpose in order to be protected.46  In another passage, the Court
suggested that the noninfringing uses must be "substantial" and
"commercially significant" to trigger protection from contributory
infringement claims. 47 Depending on how the language in Sony is
parsed, a nominal or strong showing of legitimate, noninfringing uses
will trigger protection from liability for contributory infringement.
This ambiguity has left room for courts to apply the protection of
Sony differently in the context of assessing liability for Napster and
its successors.
B. The Ninth Circuit Changes its Tune from Napster to
Grokster
The Napster decision heralded the first instance in which a court
held a third-party provider responsible for rampant, digital file sharing
of songs among Internet users. The end-user's sharing of copyrighted
material directly infringes two exclusive rights of copyright owners:
the right of reproduction and the right of distribution.48 The decision
to hold Napster liable as a third-party rested on two theories:
contributory infringement and vicarious copyright infringement.
A contributory infringement claim requires proof of (1)
knowledge of infringing activity, and (2) material contribution to it.4 9
An outgrowth of respondeat superior, vicarious copyright
infringement requires a showing that the defendant (1) has a right and
ability to supervise the infringing activity, and (2) has a direct
44. Id. at 456.
45. Id. at 440.
46. Id. at 442 ("Indeed, [the product] need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses [to merit protection]." (emphasis added)); id. ("[O]ne potential use of the Betamax plainly
satisfies this standard .... " (emphasis added)).
47. See, e.g., id. (holding that there is no contributory infringement where the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable businesses); id. ("The question is thus whether the
Betamax is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses." (emphasis added)).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (2000) (providing exclusive right of reproduction); 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3) (2000) (providing for right of distribution); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
49. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
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financial interest. ° This article will focus solely on contributory
infringement.
In granting a preliminary injunction and finding a likelihood of
success on the claim for contributory infringement, the Ninth Circuit
found that Napster had actual as well as constructive knowledge of
infringement.51 Evidence of actual knowledge included findings by
the district court that: (1) a document authored by a co-founder of
Napster mentioned the need to remain ignorant of users' real names
and IP addresses "since they are exchanging pirated music"; and (2)
notice by the Recording Industry Association to Napster about 12,000
infringing files.52 Evidence of constructive knowledge included
Napster's promotion of the site with screen shots of infringing files.
53
By "learning" of specific infringing material and "fail[ing] to purge
such material" from the system, Napster had the type of knowledge
required for liability.54 Moreover, by providing the site and facilities
for infringement, Napster also materially contributed to the infringing
activity. 55
The Ninth Circuit rejected Napster's claim that it was protected
from contributory infringement by the teachings of Sony.5 6 Honoring
Sony meant simply that it would "not impute the requisite level of
knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing
technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights. 57  The
court, nevertheless, held that Napster possessed knowledge or
constructive knowledge of infringing activity based on other factors.58
Most notably, these other factors included: (1) RIAA's notice of
12,000 infringing files that remained available on the service; (2) a
document drafted by a Napster co-founder stating the company
needed to remain ignorant of users' real names and addresses in light
of the infringing activity; and (3) promotion of Napster with screen
shots of infringing files.59
By contrast, in Grokster, the Ninth Circuit employed Sony
differently. This time the Ninth Circuit began its analysis of
50. Id. at 1022.
51. Id. at 1020.
52, ld. at 1020 n.5.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1021.
55. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
56. Id. at 1020.
57. Id. at 1020-21.
58. Id. at 1020 n.5, 1022; see also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
59. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5.
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contributory infringement with the Sony doctrine. The court inquired
first whether the product-at-issue "is capable of substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses. 6 ° If that questioned is
answered affirmatively,6' then a heightened knowledge requirement
must be satisfied in order to impose liability within the boundaries of
Sony. The copyright owners in Grokster were required to show that
the software distributors had "specific knowledge of infringement" at
a time when they contributed to the infringement and failed to act on
it.62  Thus, the new heightened standard of liability in Grokster
required a showing of contemporaneous knowledge and contribution
to the infringement.
Under this heightened knowledge standard, the type of evidence
that was probative of knowledge of infringing activity in the Napster
case carried no weight in Grokster. In Grokster, it therefore was
irrelevant that the defendants promoted their services with infringing
materials. 63  By contrast, in Napster, the court found that similar
evidence-screen shots of infringing work in promotional material-
constituted probative evidence of knowledge of infringement. 64
Furthermore, in Grokster, the court discounted that copyright
owners had sent the defendants thousands of notices of infringement
that identified millions of infringing files and the names of users
distributing them.65 By contrast, in Napster, the court found that
notice of thousands of infringing files constituted persuasive evidence
of Napster's actual knowledge of infringement.66
In Grokster, it also mattered not that the defendants, after the
onset of the lawsuit, purposefully reengineered the system to
discontinue collection of login and registration information from
users.67 By contrast, in Napster, an executive's directive to remain
ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses in light of the piracy
activity constituted persuasive evidence of knowledge of
infringement.68
60. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.
2004).
61. Id. at 1161. Some of the works distributed were public domain works and/or works
for which permission to distribute had been granted.
62. Id. at 1162 (internal citations omitted).
63. MGM Pl.-App. Br., supra note 9, at 30.
64. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
65. MGM P.-App. Br., supra note 9, at 28.
66. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5.
67. MGM P.-App. Br., supra note 9, at 13.
68. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Circuit in Grokster also found it irrelevant that the
defendants market themselves as the "next Napster" or "Alternative to
Napster Network" 69-a thinly veiled effort on the part of the Grokster
defendants to associate themselves with the infringing activities that
Napster once offered to the public. In the end, the Ninth Circuit
found what it considered to be a defining distinction between Napster
and the Grokster defendants: the structure of the technology. In
Grokster the Ninth Circuit staked a great deal of significance in the
fact that the architecture of the defendants' software differed from
Napster. Whereas Napster controlled a central server that had a
central indexing system of the music files, the technology at issue in
Grokster involved decentralized or semi-decentralized systems.70 The
Ninth Circuit held that such architecture precluded a finding of
knowledge of infringement on the part of the software distributors
because the defendants fundamentally lacked control over the
operation of the systems.7'
The copyright owners vigorously disputed that the defendants
lacked control over their systems. However, the Grokster panel, like
the district court before it, either ignored or gave no credence to the
copyright owners' evidence of control on the part of the software
distributors. For example, the record included evidence that the
defendants filter bogus files, viruses, and pornographic works.72 The
copyright owners contend this evidence demonstrates the control the
defendants can exert over the content in their systems, even as
presently configured.73 It is difficult to explain how the Grokster
courts could have disregarded or discredited such evidence on a
motion for summary judgment, in which material facts must be
assumed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.
Nevertheless, the analysis assumed factually that the defendants
lacked control over the content of their system-almost as an ipso
facto result of having a decentralized system. After concluding that
the defendants lacked control over the content, it necessarily followed
that they could not satisfy the requirement of knowledge of specific
infringement contemporaneous with contribution and failure to stop
69. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir.
2004); see also MGM Pl.-App. Br., supra note 9, at 10.
70. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-13; Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158-59; see also supra notes
22-25 and accompanying text.
71. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
72. MGM PI.-App. Br., supra note 9, at 18-19; see also id. at 21-22.
73. See, e.g., id. at 23, 60-62; MGM P1.-App. Reply Br., supra note 30, at 21-26.
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the infringing activity.
74
C. The Seventh Circuit's Approach in In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation
Aimster involved a lawsuit against a free file swapping service
that involved a centralized system, more akin to Napster than the
technology at issue in Grokster.75 The court, however, mentioned the
architecture of the system in passing, and it did not seem to play a
central role in the analysis.
In an opinion authored by Judge Posner, the Aimster court
adopted a very different approach than the Ninth Circuit in assessing
knowledge of infringement. The decision analogized contributory
infringement to the concept of "aiding and abetting.', 76  The court
agreed with the copyright owners that an encryption feature used by
the defendant to hide songs that were being copied by users of the
system evidenced "[w]illful blindness," which the court equated with
"knowledge" of infringing activity. 77 Unlike the decision in Grokster,
however, the Aimster decision held that the defendant's ability to
engineer a program differently to prevent customers from infringing
"is a factor to be considered" in determining a defendant's liability for
the infringing uses of its product.78
With regard to the Sony doctrine, Judge Posner offered a
balancing approach. If a product is offered for both infringing and
noninfringing uses, "some estimate of the respective magnitudes of
these uses is necessary" to find contributory infringement.79  Judge
Posner used some colorful analogies to illustrate this point. For
example, a retailer of a slinky dress should not be held liable for
prostitution, even if some customers are prostitutes. 80 However, the
owner of a massage parlor, whose employees only sell sex instead of
the massages theoretically offered to customers, should be liable,
74. By importing the issue of control into the issue of knowledge, the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Grokster also collapsed part of the analysis of vicarious copyright infringement into the
analysis for contributory copyright infringement. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019, 1022; see also
supra notes 49 to 50 and accompanying text (defining knowledge and material contribution as
the essential elements of contributory infringement, while the ability to supervise infringing
activity (a.k.a. control) has traditionally been an element solely of vicarious infringement).
75. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1107 (2004).
76. Id. at651.
77. Id. at 650.
78. Id. at 648.
79. Id. at 649.
80. Id. at 651.
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according to Judge Posner.81
Thus, in the Seventh Circuit's analysis, the protection of Sony
does not apply at all if infringing use of a product predominates. In
contrast, in the Ninth Circuit's Grokster decision, the mere capability
of a noninfringing use of a product resulted in affording the defendant
extra protection against liability-the application of a heightened
knowledge standard-in the name of Sony. Under the heightened
knowledge standard, a defendant must be contemporaneously aware
of and contributing to the infringement. Also in the Seventh Circuit,
the software distributor's choices in how to configure its system (i.e.,
the encryption feature) and the possibility of altering such
configuration can be weighed in assessing liability. In contrast, under
the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Grokster, the intention behind the
configuration of the software system and possibility of
reconfiguration do not factor into the assessment of liability.
III. THE ROLE OF INTENT
The inventors of the Betamax, the product at issue in Sony,
hardly intended for their product to be used primarily for infringing
purposes. The product was intended, and in fact was primarily used
for, the legitimate purpose of watching shows at a later time. 82 The
"staple article of commerce doctrine" therefore seemed to emerge
from the very concept of protecting manufacturers from liability when
they did not intend to facilitate infringement; instead some infringing
uses resulted as a byproduct.
The skirmishes over the meaning of Sony in the peer-to-peer file
sharing context, however, arise from a different set of circumstances.
The software distributors sued in these lawsuits have the
dissemination and distribution of copyrighted works as their raison
d'etre. These defendants seek to profit from the distribution of
"pirated" material, since the greater the amount of file sharing of
infringing works, the greater the amount of advertising revenue
generated for the software distributors.83
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Grokster discounted evidence of
the defendants' intent to facilitate or encourage infringement. Such
evidence included the defendants' promotional material of infringing
works and evidence that the defendants chose not to filter infringing
81. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 651.
82. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421, 443 (1984);
see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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material notwithstanding their capacity to do so. 84 Yet the issue of
contributory infringement rises and falls on knowledge. What closer
proxy for knowledge is there than evidence related to intent? Indeed,
in a variety of contexts, the law has long recognized the close
relationship between intent and knowledge.85
The Napster opinion imputed a great deal of knowledge about
infringing activity to the defendant because it viewed Napster as
having total control over the situation via a central server.8 6 In
contrast, the Grokster panel found no such control on the part of the
defendants inherent in the decentralized structure of the P2P
technology that was at issue.87 This finding is both striking and
questionable on a record of summary judgment when the defendants
in fact presented evidence to the contrary, including evidence that: (1)
the defendants' networks involved ongoing support and maintenance,
rather than a one-time sale of software, and (2) the defendants had the
capacity to filter infringing works, since they already filtered viruses
and pornographic works.
88
By focusing so heavily on the structure of technology at issue,
the analysis in Grokster elevates form over substance. One peculiar
result of this analysis is that, in the Ninth Circuit, only a central server
of the type once employed by Napster can give rise to liability. Such
a technology-specific standard of liability makes little sense in
equipping the courts to assess contributory infringement in the face of
rapidly evolving technology.
While the Ninth Circuit may have been motivated by a desire to
protect emerging technology, the technology-specific solution it
offered will likely fail to serve this purpose. A number of fledgling
84. See supra notes 63, 72-73.
85. See, e.g., McDonald v. Dewey, 202 U.S. 510, 523 (1906) (holding that there is "no
case" in which the "intent with which the shareholder got rid of his stock was [held to be]
immaterial" and irrelevant to knowledge in connection with shareholder liability); Rosen v.
United States, 161 U.S. 29, 33 (1896) (holding that in criminal law, the concept of willfulness
connotes both knowledge and evil intent).
86. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the "record supports the district court's finding that Napster has actual knowledge that
specific infringing material is available using its system, that it could block access to the system
by suppliers of infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material").
87. The Ninth Circuit went so far as to adopt the district court's findings that "even if the
Software Distributors 'closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control,
users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption."' Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
88. See, e.g., MGM P1.-App. Br., supra note 9, at 18, 47-48.
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businesses are trying to establish a profitable foothold in the market
based on high-tech, fee-based music and movie materials, including,
as detailed above, Apple's iTunes, RealNetworks' Rhapsody and
CinemaNow, and Musicmatch.89  A standard for contributory
infringement that ignores the intent of the parties creates an uneven
playing field that disfavors the most well-intentioned players in the
market. Ultimately, the businesses that seek to honor license rights of
copyright holders will face difficulty competing with file swapping
services offered for free to the end-users.
Taking away market incentives of the license-based business can
risk depressing innovation in the long run. License-based businesses
will continue to grow and invest in technology that enhances online
movie and music experience only so long as they can reasonably
anticipate profiting from those endeavors. The prospect for profit
could disappear if other companies can continue to offer an even
greater variety of material, albeit unlicensed, for free without
liability.90
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit's approach
in Aimster allows for consideration of intent-related evidence on the
part of a software distributor. By finding "willful blindness"
actionable, the court makes intent an important touchstone of the
analysis. 91 Not surprisingly, then, the Seventh Circuit deems relevant
evidence regarding the defendant's capacity to configure technology
differently in order to minimize infringement.
92
89. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
90. Depressing the market for license-based business would limit the offerings available
to consumers who, out of fear of the prospective liability or moral concerns, prefer to seek
licensed works. Regardless of how courts rule on the liability of software providers, individuals
who share files through free P2P services offering unlicensed content will remain at risk of
being sued individually for direct infringement. Both the movie and music industry have
instituted an aggressive, ongoing campaign of suing infringers directly. See, e.g., Jennifer
Alsever, Illegal Net Swapping of Music Plunges, DENVER POST, Jan. 5, 2004, at El (reporting
that the threat of individual suit reduced downloading activity on the Internet); Benny
Evangelista, RL4A Warns 204 More People It Plans to Sue, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2003, at BI,
available at
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/10/18/BUGJG2E6A51 .DTL;
David McGuire, Studios Step Up Fight Against Online Piracy, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 14,
2004 (providing reports about the campaigns against individual users launched by the RIAA and
MPAA). Moreover, many, although apparently not a majority, of people feel that downloading
unlicensed material is always unacceptable-irrespective of the threat of suit. See Amy Harmon
& John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music Files Sharers Shrug Off Guilt and Keep Sharing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at AI.
91. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1107 (2004); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
92. In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
2005)
540 SANTA C1ARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 21
In deciding Grokster, the Supreme Court will have to revisit
Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine to explain the ambiguities
gnarling the circuit courts. When it does, it should shed light on the
role of intent, which is an important component of assessing
knowledge.
Intent cannot be ferreted out numerically. Accordingly, there
should be no magic proportion of infringing versus noninfringing uses
sufficient to impose contributory infringement liability. However,
evidence of intent can and should be an important factor courts
consider in holding third-parties liable for contributory copyright
infringement.
A focus on intent can limit the risk of imposing liability too
widely in the chain of participants in a high-technology world. In a
parade-of-horribles narrative in its Ninth Circuit briefs, one of the
Grokster defendants suggested that holding it liable would also mean
that the provider of a file sharer's computer, the AOL Software used
to connect to the Internet, the cable system, and the local phone
company would face exposure to liability as well.93 However, none
of those parties has any intention to facilitate infringing activity.
An examination of intent would accord with the result recently
reached by a California district court in Perfect 10 Inc., v. Visa
International Service Association,94 a closely watched decision in the
copyright community. In Perfect 10, copyright owners of adult
entertainment images sought to hold Visa and MasterCard liable for
processing credit transactions for the purchase of this unlicensed
copyrighted material by users over the Internet.95 The district court
declined to hold the credit card companies liable on the theory that
they were not "essential" to the completion of the transactions and
that the credit cards played an insufficient role in the distribution of
the copyrighted works. 96 Absent from the analysis in that case, but
consistent with the result reached, is the consideration that the credit
card companies hardly intended for their products to be used for
infringement.
One commentator has suggested that liability for contributory
infringement should be imposed where the product is "primarily
93. Appellee Grokster, Ltd. Brief., at 3-6, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-55894 & 03-55901).
94. No. C 04-0371 JW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15895 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004).
95. Id. at *4-*5.
96. Id. at *10-* 12.
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designed or produced" for infringing purposes.97 However, an
entirely separate standard need not be created to expand the scope of
liability to capture egregious third-party actors. Instead, the Supreme
Court could simply clarify that knowledge sufficient to impose
liability for contributory infringement should include obviously
relevant evidence of intent. To the extent that a product is primarily
designed for infringing purposes, the evidence of intent to encourage
and promote infringement would be weightier than if the product
were used primarily for noninfringing purposes.
The defendant software distributors have argued that Congress
alone should decide whether to expand the scope of liability to reach
their activities. 98 In support, they cite the language from Sony that
"deference to Congress" is warranted "when major technological
innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials" and that only
Congress has the "ability to accommodate fully the varied
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by
such new technology." 99
However, technology evolves rapidly, as evidenced by the
dramatic changes in technology distribution from the central server at
issue in Napster to the more decentralized technology at issue in
Grokster.'00  As a practical matter, technology-specific solutions
cannot be legislated every time new technologies emerge. The very
rapid pace of technology's evolution disfavors an approach to liability
based on structure, such as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Grokster,
and instead requires a more intent-based standard such as the one
adopted in A imster.
In other legal disciplines, every bit as complex as technology,
courts have successfully distinguished structure from intent, or
substance over form. Examples abound in tax,' 0 ' antitrust, 102 and
97. See Feder, supra note 17, at 911-12.
98. Brief in Opposition, at 16-19, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
(No. 04-480).
99. Id. at 16 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431
(1984)).
100. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001);
Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2004);
Schiesel, supra note 20; see also supra notes 22-25, 35 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Lyon v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978) (holding that the "genuine
attributes" instead of simply the form of a sale-leaseback arrangement matter in considering tax
implications of a particular transaction); Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939)
(holding that a court would "treat a deed, absolute in [its] form, as a mortgage when it was
executed.., for a loan of money").
102. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
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employment law. 10 3 Courts are competent to make this distinction in
the world of technology and cyberspace as well.
CONCLUSION
The Sony analysis lacks any explanation of the role of intent in
determining liability for contributory infringement. Restoring some
focus on the intent of the actors involved makes eminent sense in
sorting out contributory infringement liability in the post-Napster
world. The Ninth Circuit's approach in Grokster instead emphasizes
form over substance, an approach that the Supreme Court, in its
upcoming decision, would do well to reject.
(holding that, regardless of the formal relationship between the parties as competitors, the
dominant party's conduct warranted liability in light of the actual circumstances, including the
relative sizes of the parties); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
772-74 (1984) (holding that antitrust liability under the Sherman Act should not turn on the
corporate, structural organization of a corporate subunit of a parent, but instead on the reality of
the enterprise's conduct in threatening competition).
103. For example, disparate impact analysis requires courts to examine whether facially
neutral employment practices, such as standardized testing, in fact perpetuate and reflect
intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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